One bad turn deserves another: how terrorism sustains the addiction to capital flight in Africa by Asongu, Simplice et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
One bad turn deserves another: how
terrorism sustains the addiction to
capital flight in Africa
Simplice Asongu and Rexon Nting and Evans Osabuohien
January 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/94010/
MPRA Paper No. 94010, posted 19 May 2019 09:02 UTC
1 
 
A G D I   Working Paper 
 
 
WP/19/015 
 
 
One bad turn deserves another: how terrorism sustains the addiction to 
capital flight in Africa1 
 
 
Forthcoming: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu 
Department of Economics, University of South Africa. 
P. O. Box 392, UNISA 0003, Pretoria South Africa 
E-mails: asongusimplice@yahoo.com / 
asongus@afridev.org  
 
 
Rexon T. Nting 
University of Wales, Trinity Saint David Winchester House, 
11 Cranmmer Road, London, UK, SW9 6EJ.  
Emails: rexon.nting@uwtsd.ac.uk /  
         rexonting@hotmail.com 
 
 
Evans S. Osabuohien 
Department of Economics and Development Studies, & Chair, Centre for Economic Policy 
and Development Research (CEPDeR),  
Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria  
E-mails : evans.osabuohien@covenantuniversity.edu.ng / 
pecos4eva@gmail.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 This working paper also appears in the Development Bank of Nigeria Working Paper Series. 
2 
 
2019   African Governance and Development Institute                                                          WP/19/015 
 
 
Research Department 
 
 
One bad turn deserves another: how terrorism sustains the addiction to capital flight in 
Africa 
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu, Rexon T. Nting & Evans S. Osabuohien 
 
 
January 2019 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This inquiry assesses if terrorism sustains the capital flight trap and whether the relationship is 
affected by varying the levels of governance and globalisation. The empirical evidence is 
based on interactive Generalised Method of Moments with data from 37 African countries for 
the period 1996-2010. The followings are established.  (1) Evidence of a capital flight trap is 
apparent because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on future values of capital 
flight. (2) Terrorism sustains the positive effect of the capital flight trap on capital flight. (3) 
For the most part (especially with regard to political governance), terrorism sustains the 
addiction to capital flight in above-median governance sub-samples. Policy implications are 
discussed.                        
 
JEL Classification: C50; D74; F23; N40; O55 
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1. Introduction 
Two main concerns are addressed by this inquiry. It investigates if the capital flight trap is 
sustained by terrorism, on one hand, and examines how the underlying relationship is affected 
by varying levels of governance and globalisation, on the other. In essence, in order to 
provide more options for policy, the study further assesses established linkages in the light of 
changes in six governance (political stability, voice & accountability, regulation quality, 
government effectiveness, corruption-control, and the rule of law) and two globalisation 
(trade openness and financial globalisation) variables.  
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 The policy relevance of addressing the two underlying issues motivating the inquiry is 
twofold, notably: (i) growing levels of capital flight and its corresponding negative 
consequences, and (ii) burgeoning terrorism levels in Africa. The first perspective has two 
main dimensions. On the one hand, Africa has been documented to be a net creditor to the rest 
of the world because over the past decades, capital flowing into the continent has been 
substantially lower than capital moving out of the continent (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a). 
Consistent with the narrative, 33 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) between 1970 and 
2010 lost approximately 814 billion US Dollars (in 2010 constant terms) to capital flight. 
Conversely, the main sources of external flows to SSA during the same period were 
substantially lower: with foreign direct investment and foreign aid respectively standing at 
306 and 659 billion US Dollars (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a).  
 On the other hand, there is a paradox between the need for finance in Africa and 
growing levels in capital flight from the continent. Accordingly, inadequate financial resource 
has been documented to be one of the fundamental deterrents to Africa’s development 
(Darley, 2012; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a; Tuomi, 2011; Bartels et al., 2009). In essence, 
shortage of finance has dwarfed socio-economic investment that is important for poverty 
alleviation. The narrative has been indirectly confirmed by a recent World Bank report on 
attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that has shown that with the exception 
of SSA, extreme poverty has been declining in all regions of the world (World Bank, 2015). 
The second perspective builds on growing levels of terrorism in Africa (Asongu & 
Amankwah-Amoah, 2018). While the phenomenon of terrorism is not entirely novel in the 
Africa, the rate at which it is growing in the continent is becoming an increasing policy issue 
(see Alfa-Wali et al., 2015). In line with the Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014) report, the 
Boko Haram and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) were respectively responsible for 
6,644 and 6,073 deaths. Other notorious terrorist organisations on the continent that are 
perpetrating violence include: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; Ansar Al-Shariya in Tunisia; 
the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Mulathameen Brigade that is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar; the 
Shabaab of Somalia and Ansar Dine that is headed by a former ally of Gaddafi, Iyad Ag 
Ghaly. Some recent examples of atrocities from terrorists have included, the: (i) November 
2015 Radison Blu Hotel and Sinai Russian plane crash attacks in Mali and Egypt, 
respectively; (ii) 2015 Garissa University and Westgate shopping mall attacks in Kenya by the 
Somali Al-Shabaab; (iii) Boko Haram of Nigeria stretching its sphere of terrorism to Niger, 
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Cameroon and Chad and (iv) 2015 Sousse and Bardo National Museum attacks in Tunisia 
(Efobi & Asongu, 2016).   
Contemporary African capital flight literature has focused on country-specific 
consequences and causes of capital flight, notably, on the: relationship between capital flight 
and fiscal policy (Muchai & Muchai, 2016); nexus between public social expenditure and 
capital flight in Congo-Brazzaville (Moulemvo, 2016); drivers of capital flight in Ethiopia 
(Geda & Yimer, 2016) and Madagascar (Ramiandrisoa  &  Rakotomanana, 2016); 
connections between trade misinvoicing and capital flight in Zimbabwe (Kwaramba  et al., 
2016); relationship between capital flight and tax income in Burkina Faso (Ndiaye & Siri, 
2016) and nexus between capital flight and natural resources in Cameroon (Mpenya et al., 
2016). In the light of the above, the extant contemporary studies have largely focused on inter 
alia: determinants of capital flight within the framework of real exchange rate, domestic 
private credit to gross domestic product (GDP), real interest rates, fiscal deficit and tax 
income. The positioning of this research departs from the underlying studies by assessing if 
terrorism sustains the capital flight trap and whether varying levels of governance and 
globalisation affect the relationship.  
In essence, despite the evolving streams of literature on capital flight (Mpenya et al., 
2016; Ndiaye & Siri, 2016) and terrorism (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015), 
only two studies have investigated the relationship between capital flight and terrorism, 
namely: Efobi and Asongu (2016) and Asongu and Amankwah-Amoah (2018). Whereas the 
former study has investigated the connection between capital flight and terrorism in a limited 
set of African countries, the latter has assessed the role of military expenditure in dampening 
the potentially negative effect of terrorism on capital flight. This inquiry complements the 
stream of studies by addressing the two concerns highlighted in the first paragraph of the 
introduction. By so doing, the study simultaneously articulates both the concept of capital 
flight and the notion of the capital flight trap. Distinguishing capital flight from the capital 
flight trap is relevant because the latter is a more worrying policy syndrome.  
It is worthwhile to clarify the concept of capital flight in relation to capital flows as 
well as distinguish capital flight from the capital flight trap. Consistent with Pradhan and 
Hiremath (2017), there is no consensus on the definition of capital flight because scholars are 
divided on the method by which it is estimated. According to Kindleberger (1987), capital 
flight represents “abnormal capital flows” given that these underlying outflows are traceable 
to suspicion and fears about future economic outlook. Within this framework, capital flight 
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can also be understood as export savings that citizens in the country make out of fear that their 
capital may not be safe in the future. Another stream of authors links capital flight to illegality 
or illegal income sources (Reuter & Truman, 2004; Perez et al., 2012). Capital flight can also 
be acknowledged as some of portfolio diversification in a strategy of hedging against 
macroeconomic risks and shocks (Eggerstedt et al., 1995; Collier et al., 2001; Hermes & 
Lensink, 2001; Buiter & Szegvari, 2002; Pradhan & Hiremath, 2017). As documented by 
Pradhan and Hiremath (2017), because capital flows are anticipated to move from developed 
to developing countries owing to higher marginal productivity of capital in the latter 
countries, it is reasonable to qualify the flow of capital from developing countries as “capital 
flight”.  
 In the light of the above, although capital flight is linked to capital outflows, capital 
flight entails the exclusive outflow of assets that cannot be controlled by domestic 
governments or revenue corresponding to the stock of residents’ and/or non-residents’ claims 
that are accounted for by local authorities (Dooley, 1988;Hermes & Lensink, 1992; Beja, 
2007; Pradhan & Hiremath, 2017). In accordance with Pradhan and Hiremath (2017), capital 
outflows that are tailored to leverage on higher returns are legal and normal. According to the 
narrative, in response to political uncertainties and risks, the motive of capital flight 
substantially rests on the need to place assets in safe havens, beyond the oversight of domestic 
regulators.   
 Having clarified the concept of capital flight, a capital flight trap is a scenario where 
past capital flight increases future capital flight (Efobi & Asongu, 2016). In this study, 
evidence of a capital flight trap is apparent when past values of capital flight have a positive 
effect on future values of capital flight. The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 
covers linkages between capital flight, terrorism, globalisation and governance. Section 3 
discusses the data and methodology, while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Terrorism, capital flight, governance and globalisation  
2.1 Linkages between terrorism and capital flight  
By terrorism the study refers to “the premeditated, systematic threat or use of violence by 
subnational groups to attain a political, religious, or ideological objective through 
intimidation of a large audience” (Czinkota et al., 2010, p. 828). It is very probable that 
terrorism is connected to capital flight because it is associated with economic uncertainty, 
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which could prompt investors to disinvest in the economy affected by terrorism. This intuition 
is in accordance with the substantially documented evidence that less ambiguous economic 
environments are preferred by investors (Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018; Asongu & 
Amankwah-Amoah, 2018). In essence, incidences of terrorism are very likely to lead to 
consequential economic damages that negatively influence the valuation of assets by investors 
as well as loss of confidence by investors due to the corresponding poor economic outlook. 
Hence, money and assets could be hastily flown-out of a country when it is experiencing 
incidences of terrorism. In essence, there is a strong association between the decline in 
international investment and terrorism (Blomberg & Hess, 2006). 
 Theories of political access have postulated that terrorism is linked with more violence 
and political instability compared to situations of less violence and instability (Eyerman, 
1998). Within this stream of research, the connection between terrorism and capital flight can 
be elucidated from the perspective of how violence influences cross-country movements of 
capital flows. Hence, the stock of capital flowing from one country to another could be 
decreased in events of political instability and violence because conflicts are substantially 
correlated with uncertainty in the return of investments in the future. Eventually, investors in 
an economy may be prompted to divert their investments and/or capital to other countries in 
order to secure return in investments (Davies, 2010).  
The theoretical emphasis on political instability and violence is connected to the 
definition of terrorism we are employing in the study, notably: the threatened use of force by 
sub-national actors with the aim of employing intimidation to secure political goals (Enders & 
Sandler, 2006; Czinkota et al., 2010). The nexus between terrorism and investments is further 
evident in the view that terrorism represents a somewhat distinct form of violence because for 
the most part, it targets individuals that are non-combatants (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014), in 
order to consolidate pressure on governments that are targeted. The theoretical construct is 
also in accordance with the conception and definition of capital flight employed within this 
framework, notably: the outflow of economic resources from countries in order to maintain 
the economic value of such resources (Asongu, 2014; Ndikumana et al., 2015).  
 The following features have been documented in the empirical literature on capital 
flight determinants: investments’ risks and returns (e.g. currency depreciation, financial 
instability and domestic tax rate); political and governance characteristics and economic 
structural features (e.g. reliance on natural resources). In a nutshell, the political environment 
has been established as a crucial determinant of capital flight given that it is linked to loss or 
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damage of assets as well as improvements in investment-connected premiums of insurance 
(Ndikumana et al., 2015; Davies, 2008; Collier et al., 2004). When the highlighted features 
are combined with terrorism, investors are very likely to divert their resources to countries 
that are characterised with lower investment risks.  
 
2.2 Linkages between capital flight, governance and globalisation 
Capital flight, which is the result of an offshore financial economy, has been documented to 
be a product of poor governance (Christensen, 2011; Gankou et al., 2011; Ndikumana, 2016). 
The theoretical linkages between capital flight and governance can be discussed in three main 
strands in the following chronological order: political governance; economic governance and 
institutional governance.  
In the first strand on political governance, it is very likely that investors respond to 
violence and political instability by transferring capital to economic environments that are 
linked to lower investment risks. Hence, a direct impact could be anticipated from features of 
political governance such as accountability, democracy and political instability. Furthermore, 
in scenarios where government executives dwarf ‘voice & accountability’, the domestic 
economy is likely to be compensated with more capital outflows and less capital inflows. In 
essence, a political environment is crucial in driving the flight of capital because it is 
associated with losses/damages of assets and/or variations in insurance premiums that are 
linked to investments (Ndikumana et al., 2015; Davies, 2008; Collier et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, if investors in portfolio do not have confidence in executive accountability and 
competitive elections, it is very probable that they would divert their investments to 
economies with more stable/credible political institutions. In a nutshell, characteristics of a 
political environment affect security claims that are associated with the performance of 
foreign market and foreign ownership (Lensink et al., 2000; Le & Zak, 2006). It is also more 
likely that government officials embezzle public funds and deposit the siphoned funds in tax 
havens when there is lack of accountability and political stability.  
 As concerns the second strand, investors can lose the motivation of investing in an 
economy if they perceive the economic outlook as uncertain. Such uncertain economic 
outlook is partly a fruit of poor economic governance. Put in more perspective, investors 
prefer less ambiguous investment climates (Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018). Unhealthy 
economic governance can drive considerable setbacks in an economy. These setbacks that 
affect the perceptions of investors on the value of assets can influence them to divert their 
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investments from one economy to another. It is also important to note that public officials 
within a poor economic framework can skilfully formulate and implement policies that are 
more likely to serve some corrupt vested interest. Ultimately, siphoned funds are deposited in 
tax havens.  
In the third strand on the nexus between institutional governance and capital flight, we 
argue that both corruption-control and the rule of law influence the perception that investors 
have on the health of an economy as well as the capacity of government officials to embezzle 
and divert siphoned funds to tax havens. Accordingly, it is less likely for investors to put their 
money within an economy if there is systematic disrespect of the rule of law. These investors 
are less likely to invest if they are convinced that economic governance can be slackened 
through State predation. Respect of the rule of law ensures investors that they do not run the 
risk of being expropriated of their investments. It also guarantees enhanced property rights 
protection to investors. The highlighted expropriation decreases foreign investment and 
increases capital flight. Moreover, nations with corrupt government executives for the most 
part lack the will of respecting the private rights to property and ownership.   
 Financial and trade globalisation are fundamentally associated with capital flight 
because they are by conception and definition linked to capital flows. Consistent with 
Donnelly (2015), multinational corporations operating with the fuel of increasing 
globalisation account for about 65% of illicit capital flows. Moreover, the author has 
articulated that deliberate under- and over-invoicing of trade activities constituted about 
67.4% of illicit capital outflows in Africa between 2003 and 2012. The amount lost to illicit 
capital flight annually is about 60 billion USD. Donnelly has shown that the stock of capital 
would be 60% higher if illicit financial flows were avoided in Africa. Moreover, the 
continent’s GDP would be 15% higher in the absence of illicit capital flows. The positive 
association between globalisation and illicit capital flight is consistent with a substantial bulk 
of literature on the subject (Borkowski, 1997; Tanzi, 2000; Sikka & Willmott, 2010; Asongu, 
2016). This includes, trade misinvoicing, tax avoidance and manipulation of international 
taxation privileges. The microstates and tax havens that have been growing as a result of 
increasing globalisation are also providing a safe haven for corrupt government officials in 
Africa to hide embezzled money.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
The inquiry assesses a panel of 37 African countries with data for the period 1996-2010 from 
three main sources, notably: (i) governance indicators from World Governance Indicators of 
the World Bank; (ii) macroeconomic control variables from the African Development 
Indicators of the World Bank and (iii) capital flight from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a).  The 
period of study is chosen because of constraints in data availability. While 2010 is the last 
year for capital flight; governance indicators from the World Bank are only available from 
1996.  The data consists of three-year non-overlapping intervals. The interest of employing 
data averages is to restrict instrument proliferation or limit over-identification in the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique. Therefore, for the sampled 
period, there are five three-year data non-overlapping intervals: 1996-1998; 1999-2001; 2002-
2004; 2005-2007, and 2008-2010. 
 The capital flight indicator, which is the outcome variable reveals, unrecorded capital 
flows between one country and the rest of the world. The appreciation of these capital flows 
start with inflows in foreign exchange that are incorporated into a country’s Balance of 
Payments, so that missing money (the difference between recorded inflows and corresponding 
outflows) is disclosed in terms of ‘net errors and omissions’. The adopted capital flight 
measurement is in accordance with recent literature (e.g. Weeks, 2015; Efobi & Asongu, 
2016). 
The main concern encountered with usage of the measurement of capital flight is that, 
it cannot be directly compared with other variables because it is presented in constant 2010 
US Dollars. In line with Asongu (2014), this issue is tackled by: first, transforming current 
GDP into constant 2010 terms; then, dividing the corresponding value by 1 000 000 to obtain 
a ‘GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions) and finally dividing the capital flight data by the 
‘GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions). The outcome of the transformation leads to a 
capital flight measurement that is comparable with other selected variables from the 
perspective of means and standard deviations (see Appendix 2).  
 The independent variable of interest used to examine the capital flight trap is the 
lagged value of capital flight. This lagged value of capital flight is interacted with terrorism 
indicators in order to assess the net effect on capital flight from interactions between terrorism 
and the capital flight trap.  
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 Four principal terrorism indicators are used, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear, 
and total terrorism. Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015). Domestic 
terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals of the venue 
country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from 
the venue country” (Efobi et al., 2015, p.6; Czinkota et al., 2010). Transnational terrorism is 
“terrorism including those acts of terrorism that concerns at least two countries. This implies 
that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and 
target is from another” (Efobi et al., 2015, p.6). Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes 
incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” 
(Efobi et al., 2015, p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and unclear 
terrorisms. These terrorism indicators are consistent with contemporary terrorism literature on 
Africa, notably on fighting terrorism through: (i)  inclusive development and  military 
expenditure (Asongu et al., 2017); policy harmonisation (Asongu et al., 2018a) and 
governance channels (Asongu et al., 2018b, 2019).  
 The governance indicators used for further robustness checks, which are from 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) include: political stability/non violence, voice and accountability, 
regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption-control and the rule of law. 
Globalisation indicators also used for the robustness checks are: trade openness and foreign 
direct investment proxying for trade and financial globalisation, respectively (Osabuohien et 
al, 2019; Osabuohien, Beecroft & Efobi, 2018).  
 The study controls for omitted variable bias with GDP growth, inflation, trade 
openness and foreign direct investment (FDI). The selected control variables have been 
documented by a substantial bulk of literature on capital flight (Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998, 
2001, 2003, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2013, 2015). (1) It is difficult to 
establish expected signs from trade openness and financial openness because their incidences 
on capital flight depend on whether they are restricted to a few sectors of the economy or 
broad-based. However, it is very probable that financial and trade globalisation are linked 
with capital flight because of, inter alia: greater possibilities for accounting malpractices such 
as transfer mispricing (Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2018; Ndikumana & Sarr, 2016). (2) 
Chaotic inflation positively affects capital flight because it is linked to uncertainty in the 
return on investment as well as to a negative investment/economic outlook. This intuition is in 
accordance with documented evidence that investors are more sympathetic with less 
ambiguous investment strategies (Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018).  (3) The effect of economic 
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growth on capital flight could either be negative or positive depending on whether the 
corresponding economic growth is either restricted to a few sectors of the economy (e.g. 
heavy resource industries) or broad-based. Accordingly, economic growth that is broad-based 
can affect capital flight negatively because it translates into a stable economic outlook. 
Conversely, if economic prosperity is restricted to a few sectors of the economy (like heavy 
extractive industries), capital flight is more likely to be apparent. This narrative is consistent 
with the discourse on trade openness and FDI above.  
 The definition of variables and corresponding sources are provided in Appendix 1, 
while the summary statistics is provided in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is presented in 
Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Specification  
 The choice of the Generalised Method of Moments as empirical strategy is motivated 
by five main factors: whereas the first-two represent basic requirements for implementing the 
estimation technique, the last-three are corresponding advantages (Tchamyou et al., 2018; 
Efobi et al., 2018a, 2018b, 2019). (1) The technique is designed to model the lag of a 
dependent variable, especially when persistence in the outcome variable is apparent. From a 
preliminary assessment, the criterion needed to ascertain persistence in the dependent variable 
is met because the correlation between capital flight and its first lag is 0.867, which is above 
the 0.800 rule of thumb required to establish persistence in an outcome variable. (2) The N>T 
(or 37>5) information criterion that is needed for the GMM strategy is also met because the 
number of cross sections is higher than the number of time series in each cross section. (3) 
The estimation approach controls for potential endogeneity in all regressors by accounting for 
time invariant omitted variables on the one hand and simultaneity with instrumented 
regressors on the other hand. (4) Cross-country variations are taken into account in the 
estimation approach. (5) Biases that are linked to the difference GMM strategy are addressed 
by the system GMM strategy.  
 The adopted system GMM empirical strategy in this study is from Roodman (2009ab). 
The technique is an extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) that uses forward orthogonal 
deviations instead of first differences. The extension has the advantage of restricting 
instrument proliferation and/or limiting over-identification (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017; 
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Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b). The specification is two-step instead of one-step because the 
former (latter) accounts for heteroscedasticity (homoscedasticity).  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure, where in the case of modelling the persistence of the 
outcome variables interactively; the independent variables of interest are specified to be one 
lag non-contemporary.  
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Where: tiCap ,
 
is capital flight of country i
 
at  period t ; 1, tiCap
 
 (capital flight trap) is capital 
flight of country i
 
at  period 1t ; 1, tiTer
 
is terrorism (domestic, transnational, unclear and 
total) of country i
 
at  period 1t ; 0 is a constant;
 
 represents the coefficient of auto-
regression; W  is the vector of control variables  (Trade, Growth, Inflation and FDI),
 
i
 
is the 
country-specific effect, t
 
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. 
 
3.2.2 Identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions  
 
 The robustness of a GMM specification depends on assumptions and validity of 
identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions. In accordance with recent empirical 
literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Boateng et al., 2018; 
Tchamyou et al., 2019), all independent variables are acknowledged as suspected endogenous 
or predetermined whereas time-invariant omitted variables (or years) are considered to be 
strictly exogenous. Accordingly, it is not very unfeasible for time-invariant omitted variables 
to be first-differenced endogenous (Roodman, 2009b). Hence, the strategy for treating ivstyle 
(time invariant omitted variables) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ while   the gmmstyle is used  for 
suspected endogenous  variables.  
 The concern about simultaneity is addressed with lagged regressors that are employed 
as instruments for forward differenced variables. Helmet transformations are employed to 
purge fixed effects that could potentially bias estimated nexuses because they are correlated 
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with the error terms (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Love & Zicchino, 2006; Tchamyou & Asongu, 
2017).  The transformations entail the use of forward mean-differences of variables that is 
contrary to the approach of subtracting previous observations from contemporary ones 
(Roodman, 2009b). Accordingly, the average of future observations is deducted from 
previous observations. This transformation enables orthogonal or parallel conditions between 
lagged values and forward-differenced variables. Irrespective of the number of lagged values, 
data loss is minimised by computing the suggested transformations for all observations, 
except for the last observation of each country: “And because lagged observations do not 
enter the formula, they are valid as instruments” (Roodman, 2009b, p. 104). 
 In the light of the above insights, the time invariant omitted variables affect capital 
flight exclusively via suspected endogenous or predetermined variables. Moreover, the 
statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test 
(DHT) for the validity of instruments. In order for years or time invariant indicators to elicit 
capital flight exclusively through the predetermined variables, the null hypothesis of the test 
should not be rejected. It is important to note that while with a standard instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation approach, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan 
Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test implies that the instruments explain the dependent 
variable exclusively through the predetermined variables (Beck et al., 2013; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016c), with GMM approach that employs forward orthogonal deviations, the 
information criterion used to assess whether time invariant omitted indicators exhibit strict 
exogeneity is the DHT. Therefore in the findings that are reported below, the hypothesis of 
exclusion restriction is confirmed if the DHT associated with IV(year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. 
 
4. Empirical results  
 Table 1 presents baseline regressions (in Section 4.1), Tables 2-7 contain the 
robustness checks based on varying levels of governance (in Section 4.2) while Tables 8-9 
show robustness checks using varying levels of globalisation (in Section 4.3). It is important 
to note that this inquiry is motivated by two main concerns. On the one hand, it investigates if 
the capital flight trap is sustained by terrorism. On the other hand, it examines how varying 
levels of governance and globalisation affect the underlying relationship. Whereas the first 
concern motivating this study is assessed in Section 4.1, the second concern is examined in 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
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Four principal information criteria are employed to examine the validity of the GMM 
model with forward orthogonal deviations2. Based on these criteria, the estimated models are 
overwhelmingly valid. It is important to note that, the Hansen test is robust while the Sargan 
test is not robust. Hence, in case of conflict of interest, priority is given to the Hansen test 
(Tchamyou et al., 2019; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019).  Either concern motivating the study is 
examined through prisms of the: (i) unconditional effect of the capital flight trap; (ii) 
conditional impact from  the interaction between terrorism and the capital flight trap and (iii) 
net effect from both the underlying unconditional and conditional effects. This procedure for 
computing net effects is consistent with contemporary literature on interactive regressions 
(Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018a, 2018b; Agoba et al., 2019). For example in the first column of 
Table 1, the unconditional and conditional impacts of the capital flight trap are respectively: 
0.442 and -0.085 while the corresponding net effect from the role of domestic terrorism is 
0.383 (0.422 + [-0.085×0.453])3. 
 
4.1 Baseline regressions  
 
 The following findings can be established from baseline regressions. (1) The evidence 
of a capital flight trap is consistently apparent because past values of capital flight have a 
positive effect on future values of capital flight. (2) From the unconditional effects, 
transnational (domestic) terrorism sustains (does not sustain) capital flight. (3) The net effects 
from the complementarity between the capital flight trap and either terrorism dynamics are 
positive. (4) Most of the significant control variables display the expected signs.  
 
‘Insert Table 1’ here.   
 
 
4.2 Controlling for governance  
 
 This sub-section assesses whether the established baseline findings withstand further 
empirical scrutiny when viewed in the light of varying governance levels. A median cut-off 
point is used for the governance variables in order to have some symmetry in the two sub-
                                                          
2
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200) 
3
 0.453 is the mean value of domestic terrorism.  
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samples. Out of the six good governance variables employed, there are two main indicators 
for the three sets of governance categories, namely: political stability and voice & 
accountability (for political governance), regulation quality and government effectiveness (for 
economic governance) and corruption-control and the rule of law (for institutional 
governance).  
 The following can be established from Table 2 on the linkages between capital flight, 
the capital flight trap, terrorism and dynamics of political stability. (1) There is evidence of a 
capital flight trap because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on future values 
of capital flight. (2) With the exception of unclear terrorism, the conditional effects from 
interactions between the capital flight trap and terrorism dynamics are positive on capital 
flight. (3) The net effects from the complementarity between the capital flight trap and 
terrorism dynamics are positive. (4) The findings in (1), (2) and (3) are exclusively for the 
above-median political stability sub-sample.  
 In Table 3 on the linkages between capital flight, the capital flight trap, terrorism and 
dynamics of voice and accountability, the findings in Table 2 with regards to political 
governance are confirmed as concerns the: (i) consistent significance in conditional and 
unconditional effects in above-median ‘voice & accountability’ sub-sample and (ii) exception 
of regressions pertaining to unclear terrorism that are not significant.  
 Whereas the trend on above-median sub-sample is established exclusively in 
domestic-terrorism related regressions in Table 4 on the linkages between capital flight, the 
capital flight trap, terrorism and dynamics of regulation quality, not significant effects are 
apparent in Table 5 on the linkages between capital flight, the capital flight trap, terrorism and 
dynamics of government effectiveness.  
In Table 6 on the linkages between capital flight, the capital flight trap, terrorism and 
dynamics of the rule of law, the established tendency for above-median sub-sample is 
confirmed for unclear terrorism whereas in Table 7 on the linkages between capital flight, the 
capital flight trap, terrorism and dynamics of corruption-control, the above-median sub-
sample tendency is: (i) confirmed for domestic and total terrorism; (ii) unconfirmed for 
unclear terrorism and (iii) insignificant for transnational terrorism.  
 
‘Insert Tables 2-7’ here.   
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4.3 Controlling for globalisation    
 
This sub-section examines whether the established baseline findings withstand further 
empirical scrutiny when viewed in the light of varying globalisation levels. A median cut-off 
is used for the globalisation variables in order to have some symmetry in the two sub-samples. 
Two main globalisation variables are used, namely: trade openness (Table 8) and financial 
globalisation (Table 9).  
The following can be established from Table 8 on the linkages between capital flight, 
the capital flight trap, terrorism and dynamics of trade openness. (1) There is evidence of a 
capital flight trap because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on future values 
of capital flight. (2) No net effects are apparent because unconditional and conditional effects 
are insignificant for the most part.  
The following can be established from Table 9 on the linkages between capital flight, 
the capital flight trap, terrorism and dynamics of foreign direct investment. (1) There is 
evidence of a capital flight trap because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on 
future values of capital flight (2) While the net effect from transnational terrorism is positive 
for below-median levels of FDI, the corresponding conditional effect is negative.  
 
 ‘Insert Tables 8-9’ here.   
 
 
5. Concluding implications, contribution and future research directions 
 
This paper has assessed if terrorism sustains the capital flight trap and whether varying 
levels of governance and globalisation affect the relationship. The empirical evidence is based 
on interactive Generalised Method of Moments and data from 37 African countries for the 
period 1996-2010. The following findings have been established.  (1) Evidence of a capital 
flight trap is apparent because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on future 
values of capital flight. (2) Terrorism sustains the positive effect of the capital flight trap on 
capital flight. (3) For the most part (especially with regards to political governance), terrorism 
sustains the addiction to capital flight in above-median governance sub-samples. (4) The 
incidence of varying levels of globalization is not significant for trade openness and scantily 
significant for foreign direct investment.  
The puzzle the study elucidates is why terrorism sustains the addiction of capital flight 
in above-median governance sub-samples.  A possible reason could be that countries with 
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better governance standards are more sensitive to terrorism compared to their counterparts 
with poor governance standards.  The higher responsiveness of countries with above-median 
standards of governance can be elucidated from perspectives of investors and government 
officials. From the perspective of investors, the advent of terrorism is likely to increase their 
risk perception in countries with above-median governance more proportionately than in 
countries with below-median governance. As concerns government officials, at the advent of 
terrorism, their ability to siphon and deposit money abroad is also more likely to increase in 
countries with above-median governance, compared to their counterparts with below-median 
governance.  
 This empirical assessment, which has focused on linkages between the capital flight 
trap, capital flight and terrorism, has simultaneously contributed to the macroeconomic 
literature on modeling the addiction of negative macroeconomic variables and to the evolving 
literature on understanding how different negative macroeconomic variables interact under 
varying institutional and globalization environments. 
Future research can improve the existing literature by employing the empirical 
underpinning on more macroeconomic variables with negative signals. In so doing, 
researchers should consider more updated measurements of capital flight. Accordingly, while 
the indicator proposed by Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a) used in this study is based on a 
residual measure of capital flight; such a measurement does not incorporate foreign 
institutional inflows. A measurement of capital flight which includes foreign institutional 
inflows has been documented by Pradhan and Hiremath (2017) and Brada et al., (2013) who 
have argued that their measure of capital flight is more conservative and potentially more 
robust than the measure proposed by Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a). 
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Table 1: Baseline Regressions  
         
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight 
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism   Total Terrorism  
Constant  5.404*** 4.996*** 8.082*** 6.215*** 6.415*** 5.898*** 6.000*** 5.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) 0.422*** 0.519*** 0.145** 0.347*** 0.383*** 0.400*** 0.359*** 0.493*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic T. -0.085*** -0.072*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.002)       
Transnational T. --- --- -0.047 -0.049 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.121) (0.161)     
Unclear T. --- --- --- --- 0.083*** 0.136** --- --- 
     (0.001) (0.030)   
Total T.  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.105*** -0.068** 
       (0.000) (0.020) 
Domestic T.(-1)×CF(-1) -0.085*** -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.472)       
Transnational T.(-1)×CF(-1) --- --- 0.001 0.005** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.544) (0.039)     
Unclear T. (-1)×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.00009 -0.0009 --- --- 
     0.944)) (0.740)   
Total T. (-1)×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 0.001 
       (0.443) (0.385) 
Trade  0.003** 0.00005 0.003*** 0.002* -0.0009 -0.0002 0.003** -0.00003 
 (0.046) (0.973) (0.005) (0.086) (0.530) (0.883) (0.027) (0.984) 
GDP growth  -0.007* -0.005 -0.004 -0.006* -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.055) (0.233) (0.130) (0.058) (0.163) (0.165) (0.169) (0.181) 
Inflation  0.002*** 0.002*** --- 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Investment  --- -0.001 --- -0.010** --- -0.006** --- -0.004 
  (0.418)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.215) 
         
Net Effects  0.383 n.a n.a 0.348 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
         
AR(1) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
AR(2) (0.109) (0.108) (0.283) (0.153) (0.128) (0.115) (0.131) (0.145) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.519) (0.502) (0.733) (0.774) (0.537) (0.781) (0.620) (0.498) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.544) (0.626) (0.401) (0.383) (0.403) (0.452) (0.576) (0.650) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.440) (0.378) (0.797) (0.856) (0.554) (0.824) (0.540) (0.362) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.277) (0.363) (0.690) (0.374) (0.515) (0.596) (0.286) (0.023) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.593) (0.549) (0.637) (0.862) (0.483) (0.738) (0.700) (0.994) 
         
Fisher  3735.79*** 645.36*** 1109.49*** 2209.91*** 1518.71*** 599.28*** 5012.20*** 660.55*** 
Instruments  36 40 36 40 36 40 36 40 
Countries  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations  382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. DHT: Difference in Hansen 
Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of 
bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the 
Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient required for the computation of net 
effects is not significant. 
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Table  2: Controlling for Political Stability(PS)  
         
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight 
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism   Total Terrorism  
 
PS ≤M PS>M PS ≤M PS>M PS ≤M PS>M PS ≤M PS>M 
         
Constant  -2.159 4.284*** -2.915 6.674*** 2.247 (omitted) 7.419 3.509*** 
 
(0.425) (0.000) (0.626) (0.000) (0.217)  (0.113) (0.000) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) 0.383 0.598*** 0.259 0.337*** 0.755** 0.966*** 0.271 0.683*** 
 (0.140) (0.000) (0.351) (0.001) (0.049) (0.000) (0.399) (0.000) 
Domestic T. -0.026 0.085** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.698) (0.025)       
Transnational T. --- --- -0.202 0.055 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.191) (0.357)     
Unclear T. --- --- --- --- -1.631 0.238*** --- --- 
     (0.375) (0.000)   
Total T.  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.011 0.039 
       (0.925) (0.198) 
Domestic T.(-1) ×CF(-1) 0.003 0.007*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.705) (0.002)       
Transnational T.(-1)×CF(-1) --- --- 0.002 0.011** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.815) (0.011)     
Unclear T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.016 -0.018*** --- --- 
     (0.514) (0.000)   
Total T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.005 0.008** 
       (0.504) (0.020) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Net Effects  n.a nsa n.a 0.339 n.a 0.963 n.a 0.687 
         
AR(1) (0.035) (0.010) (0.109) (0.004) (0.107) (0.004) (0.093) (0.003) 
AR(2) (0.438) (0.039) (0.320) (0.570) (0.933) (0.474) (0.472) (0.101) 
Sargan OIR (0.047) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.934) (1.000) (0.766) (1.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.918) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.998) (0.666) (0.652) (0.543) (0.852) (0.805) (0.889) (0.624) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (0.921) (1.000) (0.751) (1.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.913) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.865) (0.202) (0.963) (0.511) (0.781) (0.758) (0.775) (0.175) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.771) (1.000) (0.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
         
Fisher  868.97***   994.39*** 153.89*** 435.34*** 378.95*** 2.5e+10**
* 
73.99*** 1188.34*** 
Instruments  39 40 39 40 39 40 39 40 
Countries  23 33 23 33 23 33 23 33 
Observations  148 234 148 234 148 234 148 234 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of Political 
Stability (-0.4723). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-
identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient required for the computation of net effects is not significant. nsa: not specifically applicable because the 
estimated model is not valid.  
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Table 3: Controlling for Voice and Accountability   
         
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight 
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism   Total Terrorism  
 
VA ≤M VA>M VA ≤M VA>M VA ≤M VA>M VA ≤M VA>M 
         
Constant  33.246** 4.487*** 8.662 6.072*** 2.831 4.721*** 0.681 3.408*** 
 (0.032) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.613) (0.000) (0.800) (0.000) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) -1.356 0.570*** 0.024 0.410*** 0.402 0.548*** 0.628*** 0.676*** 
 (0.173) (0.000) (0.957) (0.000) (0.299) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Domestic T. -1.192* 0.058 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.052) (0.164)       
Transnational T. --- --- -0.063 0.039 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.431) (0.349)     
Unclear T. --- --- --- --- 0.488 0.194*** --- --- 
     (0.382) (0.003)   
Total T.  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.328 0.036 
       (0.291) (0.831) 
Domestic T.(-1) ×CF(-1) 0.080* 0.007*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.058) (0.002)       
Transnational T.(-1)×CF(-1) --- --- 0.015 0.013*** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.188) (0.000)     
Unclear T. (-1)×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.0005 -0.006 --- --- 
     (0.946) (0.168)   
Total T. (-1)×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.026 0.005*** 
       (0.300) (0.007) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Net Effects  n.a 0.573 n.a 0.413 n.a n.a n.a 0.679 
         
AR(1) (0.220) (0.010) (0.140) (0.004) (0.180) (0.000) (0.100) (0.010) 
AR(2) (0.200) (0.125) (0.972) (0.466) (0.604) (0.005) (0.506) (0.104) 
Sargan OIR (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.885) (0.997) (0.835) (1.000) (0.991) (1.000) (0.518) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.959) (0.554) (0.915) (0.279) (0.928) (0.314) (0.878) (0.639) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (0.897) (0.987) (0.960) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.390) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.881) (0.189) (0.492) (0.195) (0.820) (0.605) (0.948) (0.140) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (0.997) (1.000) (0.985) (1.000) (0.998) (1.000) (0.815) 
         
Fisher  130.49*** 789.04*** 175.06*** 411.74*** 167.04*** 401.94*** 126.81*** 952.23*** 
Instruments  39 40 39 40 39 40 39 40 
Countries  23 32 23 32 23 32 23 32 
Observations  157 225 157 225 157 225 157 225 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of Voice and 
Accountability  (-0.78323). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient required for the computation of net effects is not significant.  
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Table  4: Controlling for Regulation Quality    
         
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight 
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism   Total Terrorism  
 
RQ ≤M RQ>M RQ ≤M RQ>M RQ ≤M RQ>M RQ ≤M RQ>M 
         
Constant  4.010 4.332*** 1.572 5.116*** 7.605** 4.540*** 2.113 4.185*** 
 
(0.155) (0.000) (0.682) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.319) (0.000) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) 0.154 0.583*** 0.312 0.531*** 0.304 0.559*** 0.249 0.604*** 
 (0.717) (0.000) (0.331) (0.000) (0.245) (0.000) (0.401) (0.000) 
Domestic T. 0.147 0.016 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.413) (0.754)       
Transnational T. --- --- 0.087 -0.098** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.443) (0.034)     
Unclear T. --- --- --- --- 0.301 0.096 --- --- 
     (0.712) (0.370)   
Total T.  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.128 0.031 
       (0.299) (0.439) 
Domestic T.(-1) ×CF(-1) -0.007 0.008*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.318) (0.001)       
Transnational T.(-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- 0.007 0.001 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.447) (0.747)     
Unclear T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.011 0.002 --- --- 
     (0.218) (0.721)   
Total T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.002 0.005 
       (0.796) (0.103) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Net Effects  n.a 0.586 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
         
AR(1) (0.159) (0.160) (0.040) (0.021) (0.007) (0.027) (0.038) (0.030) 
AR(2) (0.707) (0.256) (0.505) (0.142) (0.301) (0.136) (0.335) (0.211) 
Sargan OIR (0.024) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.902) (1.000) (0.967) (1.000) (0.968) (1.000) (0.888) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.924) (0.577) (0.813) (0.243) (0.916) (0.427) (0.755) (0.511) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (0.909) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (0.996) (1.000) (0.917) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.932) (0.128) (0.895) (0.078) (0.715) (0.331) (0.884) (0.115) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) (1.000) 
Fisher  752.13*** 1780.50*** 196.79*** 344.21*** 1286.42*** 3342.77**
* 
345.87*** 1618.53*** 
Instruments  39 40 39 40 23 40 23 40 
Countries  23 31 23 31 39 31 39 31 
Observations  133 249 133 249 133 249 133 249 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of Regulation 
Quality (-0.58724). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-
identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient required for the computation of net effects is not significant.  
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Table 5: Controlling for Government Effectiveness    
         
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight 
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism   Total Terrorism  
 
GE≤M GE>M GE≤M GE>M GE≤M GE>M GE≤M GE>M 
         
Constant  6.283 4.586*** 7.035 5.247*** -0.215 4.992*** 3.216 3.227*** 
 
(0.266) (0.000) (0.336) (0.000) (0.962) (0.000) (0.641) (0.001) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) 0.576*** 0.538*** 0.001 0.494*** 0.828** 0.507*** 0.984 0.708*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.991) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.347) (0.000) 
Domestic T. -0.111 -0.037 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.194) (0.123)       
Transnational T. --- --- 0.046 -0.145 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.893) (0.133)     
Unclear T. --- --- --- --- -2.159 0.351** --- --- 
     (0.259) (0.029)   
Total T.  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.101 -0.045 
       (0.487) (0.112) 
Domestic T.(-1) ×CF(-1) 0.002 -0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.621) (0.437)       
Transnational T.(-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- 0.020 0.008 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.196) (0.118)     
Unclear T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.007 -0.019 --- --- 
     (0.746) (0.101)   
Total T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.025 0.004 
       (0.524) (0.152) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Net Effects  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
         
AR(1) (0.272) (0.008) (0.707) (0.002) (0.042) (0.003) (0.366) (0.004) 
AR(2) (0.997) (0.226) (0.667) (0.334) (0.404) (0.153) (0.446) (0.229) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.286) (1.000) (0.779) (1.000) (0.946) (1.000) (0.817) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.978) (0.549) (0.981) (0.350) (0.994) (0.193) (0.846) (0.447) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (0.199) (1.000) (0.881) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.867) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.832) (0.059) (0.978) (0.282) (0.999) (0.386) (0.941) (0.183) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (0.707) (1.000) (0.920) (1.000) (0.992) (1.000) (0.984) 
Fisher  99.11*** 617.01*** 229.50*** 729.68*** 280.26*** 1408.7*** 1107.90*** 1709.86*** 
Instruments  40 40 39 40 39 40 39 40 
Countries  24 32 22 31 22 31 22 31 
Observations  151 231 136 246 136 246 136 246 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of Government 
Effectiveness (-0.66608). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient required for the computation of net effects is not significant.  
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Table 6: Controlling for the Rule of Law  (RL)  
         
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight 
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism   Total Terrorism  
 
RL≤M RL>M RL≤M RL>M RL≤M RL>M RL≤M RL>M 
         
Constant  13.740*** 3.790*** -2.191 5.348*** 0.211 5.116*** 4.218 3.156*** 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.778) (0.000) (0.978) (0.000) (0.432) (0.001) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) -0.060 0.646*** 0.463** 0.496*** 0.852 0.545*** 0.498** 0.695*** 
 (0.878) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
Domestic T. -0.274* 0.080** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.057) (0.028)       
Transnational T. --- --- 0.421 -0.020 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.226) (0.708)     
Unclear T. --- --- --- --- -2.704 0.324** --- --- 
     (0.465) (0.023)   
Total T.  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.046 -0.014 
       (0.914) (0.727) 
Domestic T.(-1) ×CF(-1) -0.015 0.005 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.184) (0.133)       
Transnational T.(-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- -0.021 0.008 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.265) (0.136)     
Unclear T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.032 -0.019* --- --- 
     (0.250) (0.076)   
Total T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.008 0.005 
       (0.812) (0.147) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Net Effects  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.321 n.a n.a 
         
AR(1) (0.169) (0.005) (0.204) (0.021) (0.606) (0.009) (0.675) (0.006) 
AR(2) (0.143) (0.199) (0.186) (0.220) (0.787) (0.788) (0.952) (0.165) 
Sargan OIR (0.097) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.967) (1.000) (0.786) (1.000) (0.965) (1.000) (0.854) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.955) (0.439) (0.999) (0.254) (1.000) (0.107) (1.000) (0.417) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (0.995) (1.000) (0.940) (0.994) (1.000) (0.996) (0.920) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.947) (0.201) (0.998) (0.100) (0.810) (0.456) (0.824) (0.119) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.997) (1.000) (0.994) (1.000) (0.999) 
Fisher  373.11*** 303.25*** 339.90*** 286.44*** 715.16*** 1234.2*** 80.01*** 641.71 
Instruments  39 40 39 40 39 40 39 40 
Countries  24 30 22 30 22 30 22 30 
Observations  159 233 140 242 140 242 140 242 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of Rule of Law  
(-0.65344). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and 
the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient required for the computation of net effects is not significant.  
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Table  7: Controlling for Corruption-Control (CC)  
         
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight 
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism   Total Terorrism  
 
CC ≤M CC>M CC ≤M CC>M CC ≤M CC>M CC ≤M CC>M 
         
Constant  8.185** 4.406*** 14.041** 5.896*** 3.471 4.679*** 2.670 3.572*** 
 (0.040) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.349) (0.000) (0.667) (0.003) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) 0.309 0.618*** 0.143 0.430*** 0.589** 0.551*** 0.121 0.677*** 
 (0.354) (0.000) (0.467) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.572) (0.000) 
Domestic T. -0.044 0.055* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.751) (0.097)       
Transnational T. --- --- -0.407* -0.061 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.099) (0.373)     
Unclear T. --- --- --- --- -2.154* 0.171* --- --- 
     (0.078) (0.098)   
Total T.  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.876* -0.001 
       (0.054) (0.975) 
Domestic T.(-1) ×CF(-1) -0.008 0.006** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.476) (0.035)       
Transnational T.(-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- 0.028** 0.007 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.019) (0.103)     
Unclear T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.034* -0.0008 --- --- 
     (0.051) (0.893)   
Total T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.053** 0.006* 
       (0.043) (0.072) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Net Effects  n.a 0.620 n.a n.a 0.592 n.a n.a 0.680 
         
AR(1) (0.249) (0.014) (0.393) (0.013) (0.340) (0.010) (0.224) (0.009) 
AR(2) (0.254) (0.222) (0.954) (0.382) (0.357) (0.133) (0.437) (0.285) 
Sargan OIR (0.048) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.840) (1.000) (0.688) (1.000) (0.874) (1.000) (0.837) 
 
        
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (1.000) (0.432) (0.585) (0.243) (0.757) (0.312) (0.632) (0.590) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (0.900) (1.000) (0.868) (1.000) (0.971) (1.000) (0.817) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.998) (0.091) (0.933) (0.150) (0.763) (0.205) (0.548) (0.149) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.943) (1.000) (0.993) (1.000) (0.995) 
Fisher  389.53*** 656.94*** 360.91*** 629.06*** 212.72*** 4461.6*** 63.84*** 2700.26*** 
Instruments  39 40 39 40 39 40 39 40 
Countries  22 30 23 31 23 31 23 31 
Observations  141 241 148 234 148 234 148 234 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of Corruption 
Control (-0.65021). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-
identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient required for the computation of net effects is not significant.  
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Table 8: Controlling for Trade Openness (TO)    
         
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight 
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism   Total Terorrism  
 
TO ≤M TO>M TO ≤M TO>M TO ≤M TO>M TO ≤M TO>M 
         
Constant  12.454** 5.458*** 6.431*** 7.204*** 5.890*** 6.137*** 4.508*** 6.354** 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.000) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.045) (0.014) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) -0.267 0.454** 0.548*** 0.282 0.462** 0.411** 0.624*** 0.373* 
 (0.603) (0.010) (0.000) (0.326) (0.029) (0.025) (0.002) (0.052) 
Domestic T. 0.125 0.040 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.220) (0.622)       
Transnational T. --- --- 0.013 0.163 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.958) (0.163)     
Unclear T. --- --- --- --- 0.125 0.205 --- --- 
     (0.345) (0.584)   
Total T.  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.129 0.057 
       (0.170) (0.503) 
Domestic T.(-1) ×CF(-1) -0.024* 0.011 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.097) (0.260)       
Transnational T.(-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- -0.001 0.012 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.954) (0.362)     
Unclear T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.002 -0.112 --- --- 
     (0.871) (0.110)   
Total T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.006 0.011 
       (0.200) (0.489) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Net Effects  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
         
AR(1) (0.144) (0.081) (0.088) (0.054) (0.419) (0.051) (0.044) (0.090) 
AR(2) (0.325) (0.697) (0.182) (0.232) (0.832) (0.586) (0.863) (0.809) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (0.997) (1.000) (0.994) (1.000) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (1.000) (0.839) (0.476) (0.303) (0.838) (0.632) (0.618) (0.532) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.991) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.994) (1.000) (0.999) (1.000) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.332) (0.627) (0.626) (0.840) (0.840) (0.761) (0.674) (0.630) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999) (0.994) (1.000) (0.998) (1.000) 
Fisher  81324*** 1515.57*** 1777.27*** 1425.47*** 1080.60*** 4236.1*** 6192.99*** 793.63*** 
Instruments  40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Countries  24 25 24 25 24 25 24 25 
Observations  192 190 192 190 192 190 192 190 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of Political Trade 
Openness (67.771). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-
identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient required for the computation of net effects is not significant.  
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Table  9: Controlling for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
         
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight 
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism   Total Terorrism  
 
FDI ≤M FDI>M FDI ≤M FDI>M FDI ≤M FDI>M FDI ≤M FDI>M 
         
Constant  2.340*** 2..864*** 2.937*** 5.179*** 4.963*** 4.834*** 2.505* 4.464*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.067) (0.000) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) 0.787*** 0.687*** 0.725*** 0.483*** 0.543*** 0.556*** 0.769*** 0.540*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic T. 0.037 -0.064 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.546) (0.149)       
Transnational T. --- --- 0.025 -0.020 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.689) (0.712)     
Unclear T. --- --- --- --- 0.240** -0.129 --- --- 
     (0.028) (0.670)   
Total T.  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.021 -0.133** 
       (0.582) (0.026) 
Domestic T.(-1) ×CF(-1) -0.001 0.007*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.553) (0.007)       
Transnational T.(-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- -0.011** 0.009 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.040) (0.192)     
Unclear T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.002 -0.0007 --- --- 
     (0.515) (0.924)   
Total T. (-1) ×CF(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.006 0.007 
       (0.126) (0.072) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Net Effects  n.a nsa 0.722 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
         
AR(1) (0.028) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) 
AR(2) (0.562) (0.098) (0.330) (0.104) (0.534) (0.235) (0.350) (0.276) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.852) (0.906) (0.708) (0.940) (0.942) (0.853) (0.727) (0.908) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.228) (0.320) (0.455) (0.317) (0.259) (0.278) (0.426) (0.174) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.983) (0.985) (0.734) (0.996) (0.999) (0.970) (0.776) (0.999) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.119) (0.736) (0.455) (0.524) (0.209) (0.446) (0.299) (0.709) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.999) (0.848) (0.734) (0.967) (1.000) (0.907) (0.864) (0.864) 
Fisher  53264*** 551.56*** 7471.50*** 378.63*** 1784.16*** 1028.3*** 5565.34*** 233.83*** 
Instruments  40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Countries  30 29 30 29 30 29 30 29 
Observations  181 201 181 201 181 201 181 201 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of Foreign Direct 
Investment (2.3372). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-
identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one 
estimated coefficient required for the computation of net effects is not significant. nsa: not specifically applicable because the 
estimated model is not valid.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurements) Sources 
    
Capital Flight  Ln of Capital Flight (constant of 2010) Ndikumana & 
Boyce (2012a) 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  Quality  RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Domestic Terrorism  Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln)  Enders et al. 
(2011). 
    
Transnational 
Terrorism 
 Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) Enders et al. 
(2011). 
    
Unclear Terrorism  Number of Unclear terrorism incidents (in Ln) Enders et al. 
(2011). 
    
Total Terrorism  Number of Total terrorism incidents (in Ln) Enders et al. 
(2011). 
    
Trade Openness  Trade  Export plus Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP growth  GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign investment  FDI Foreign Direct Investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.   
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2010) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Capital flight (log) 9.993 0.806 6.816 12.333 464 
Political Stability -0.637 0.943 -2.986 1.188 444 
Voice & Accountability  -0.668 0.667 -1.885 0.932 444 
Government Effectiveness  -0.640 0.578 -1.974 0.876 443 
Regulation Quality  -0.631 0.562 -2.412 0.791 444 
Rule of Law -0.694 0.613 -2.207 0.773 444 
Control of Corruption  -0.571 0.579 -2.057 1.249 443 
Domestic Terrorism  0.453 0.870 0.000 4.488 555 
Transnational Terrorism 0.242 0.536 0.000 3.332 555 
Unclear Terrorism  0.112 0.425 0.000 4.488 555 
Total Terrorism  0.605 1.000 0.000 4.844 555 
Trade Openness   75.890 39.816 17.858 255.015 525 
GDP growth   4.435 4.661 -17.254 33.629 540 
Inflation  74.917 1099.538 -100.00 24411.03 508 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows  3.994 5.935 -8.629 40.157 405 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrix (1996-2010)  
          
Terrorism Control variables  
 
Domestic  Transnational  Unclear   Total Trade  GDP 
growth 
Inflation  Foreign 
Investment  
Capital 
Flight  
 
1.000 0.528 0.451 0.914 -0.185 -0.007 0.024 -0.031 0.225 Domestic  
 1.000 0.490 0.751 -0.118 0.007 0.075 -0.021 0.233 Transnational  
  1.000 0.631 -0.129 -0.058 0.123 -0.043 0.221 Unclear 
   1.000 -0.197 -0.030 0.074 -0.047 0.263 Total  
    1.000 0.020 0.115 0.362 -0.146 Trade  
     1.000 0.038 0.113 0.068 GDP growth 
      1.000 0.013 0.203 Inflation 
       1.000 -0.102 Foreign Investment 
        1.000 Capital Flight  
          
GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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